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Hayskar and Hall:CASE
Family
Law: Recognition of Mexican Divorces in Florida
COMMENTS
FAMILY LAW: RECOGNITION OF MEXICAN DIVORCES
IN FLORIDA
Kittel v. Kittel, 194 So. 2d 640 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1967)
On November 29, 1963, defendant, a Florida resident, traveled to Mexico
where he instituted an action for divorce. After complying with local residence requirements," he filed suit alleging incompatibility of temperaments,
a proper ground for divorce in Mexico. Defendant returned to the United
States before the divorce was granted and remarried on December 27, 1963,
the day the Mexican decree became final. Defendant's first wife instituted
the present action to have the divorce decree declared void, and at trial the
chancellor ruled in her favor. On appeal, the Third District Court of Appeal
HELD, that the ex parte divorce was not entitled to recognition as a matter
of comity. Decree affirmed.
States are required to recognize the divorce decrees of a sister state having
proper jurisdiction by the judicial proceedings section of the full faith and
credit clause. 2 Divorce decrees of foreign nations are recognized as a matter
of comity based on respect for other sovereigns. 3 Unless there is a valid
reason to withhold recognition 4 the judgment of a foreign tribunal usually
will be given effect, but each state is free to establish its own standards for
granting comity.5
The Florida standards of comity were first expressed in Pawley v. Pawley,6
where the parties lived in Cuba for several years before their divorce. After
a visit to the United States the husband returned to Cuba but the wife refused
to accompany him. More than a year after his return, the husband secured a
divorce in Cuba on the ground of desertion. The Florida Supreme Court
recognized the divorce over the wife's challenge, discussing three reasons why
the decree did not offend Florida public policy: (a) the husband's Cuban
domicile was bona fide; (b) the grounds for divorce were sufficient under
Florida law, and (c) the wife had a fair opportunity to defend the suit.
The Kittel court in following Pawley concluded that the decree in question violated Florida's public policy for three reasons. First, the Mexican
court lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter because the husband's domicile
was not genuine according to common law notions of domicile. Genuine
domicile is the sine qua non of jurisdiction to render divorce in the United

I. Codigo de Procedimiento Civiles Para El Estado de Chihuahua, Ley de Divorcis, arts.
22-24 (Mexico 1952). Under Mexican law where the plaintiff establishes residence by securing a certificate from the municipal register, an authorized judge is competent to hear
a contested divorce action.
2. U.S. CONsr. art. IV, §1: "Full faith and credit shall be given in each State to the
public acts, records and judicial proceedings of every other State."
3. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895); Beckwith v. Bailey, 119 Fla. 316, 161
So. 576 (1935).
4. Beckwith v. Bailey, 119 Fla. 316, 161 So. 576 (1935).
5. A. EHRENZWEIG, CONFLIcr op LAws §72 (2d ed. 1962).
6. 46 So. 2d 464 (Fla. 1950).
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States 7 Domicile requires a relationship between a person and a place of
such permanence that the courts of the place acquire a primary interest in
determining the person's legal relationships. s Domicile is evidenced by the
simultaneous occurrence of physical presence with the intent to establish
permanent residence, 9 and may be acquired instantly in absence of contrary
statute. 10 Mere recital of domicile in a decree will not make the jurisdiction
issue res judicata, and the factual foundations of domicile may be reexamined
in collateral proceedings questioning the jurisdiction of the court."
Unlike the defendant in Pawley,1" the defendant in Kittel had no previous
domicile in Mexico. He apparently went there for the sole purpose of securing a divorce, staying only thirteen days. The Florida court properly concluded from the circumstances that his claim of bona fide domicile was a
sham and that the Mexican court therefore lacked jurisdiction to render the
decree. 13 This finding alone would constitute a basis for Florida's refusal
to recognize the decree, but two other factors implicit in the decision merit
discussion.
As a condition to recognition, Florida requires that foreign divorces be
rendered on facts legally equivalent to grounds for divorce in Florida. 14 The
Pawley court made the express finding that the facts constituting the legal
ground of desertion in Cuba were sufficient for divorce under Florida law. 15
In Beckwith v. Bailey,16 the court recognized an Idaho decree as a matter of
comity despite its ineligibility for full faith and credit because of a defect of
notice. As support for this extension of comity, the Florida court stated that
Idaho's ground of cruelty was legally equivalent to the Florida ground of
extreme cruelty. The Kittel divorce was based on incompatibility, which is
not a proper ground in Florida, and it may be that the Kittel court refused
recognition to prevent Florida residents from forum shopping for more
17
liberal statutes.
Finally, the fact that the wife had no real opportunity to contest the
divorce was a persuasive factor in the Kittel result. The Pawley court decried
the injustice that would result from recognition of a foreign divorce hastily
obtained while the husband was on brief vacation.18 By flying to Juarez for
two weeks, the defendant in Kittel, despite timely notice, effectively prevented his wife from defending the divorce. This inquiry into the funda7. Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
8. Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945).
9. In re Toler's Estate, 325 S.W.2d 755 (Mo. 1959); In re Publicker's Estate, 385 Pa.
403, 123 A.2d 655 (1956).
10. Bixby v. Bixby, 361 P.2d 1075 (Okla. 1961); Winans v. Winans, 205 Mass. 388, 91

N.E. 394 (1910).
11.
12.

Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 230 (1945).
46 So. 2d 464 (Fla. 1950).
Kittel v. Kittel, 194 So. 2d 640 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1967).

13.
14. Ogden v. Ogden, 159 Fla. 604, 33 So. 2d 870, 874 (1947); Parker v. Parker, 155 Fla.
635, 21 So. 2d 141 (1945).
15. 46 So. 2d 464 (Fla. 1950).
16.
17.

119 Fla. 316, 161 So. 576 (1935).
A. EHRENZWEIG, Supra note 5.

18. 119 Fla. 316, 161 So. 576 (1935).
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